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This paper considers price setting in pure units of account, linked to
the means of payment through managed parities. If prices are sticky in
the units in which they are set, parity changes may facilitate equilibrium
adjustment of relative prices. The paper derives simultaneously the opti-
mal choice of unit of account by each price setter, and the optimal parity
policy. The gains from having multiple units of account are computed for
a simple calibrated economy. (JEL E4, E5, F4)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The salary is 2,000 livres a year, but I should have to spend six months at
Versailles and other six in Paris, or wherever I like. I do not think that
I shall accept it, but I have yet to hear the advice of some good friends
on the subject. After all, 2,000 livres is not such a big sum. It would be
so in German money, I admit, but here it is not. It amounts to 83 louis
d’or, 8 livres a year - that is, to 915 ﬂorins, 45 kreuzer in our money
(a considerable sum, I admit), but here worth only 333 thalers, 2 livres -
which is not much. It is frightful how quickly a thaler disappears here.
W.A. Mozart, 1778.
Medieval and early modern Europe was a world of porous monetary borders
and sovereigns bent on debasing their coinage. Weights of precious metal and
tallies of circulating coins, local and foreign, competed as standards of value.
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1In a lesser known twist, there were also units of account without any physical
embodiment, deﬁned by legal tender parities to the means of payment. Parities
that could be changed at will made the disembodied units of account - which
Einaudi (1936) aptly termed ‘imaginary money’ - more than aliases for ﬁxed
multiples of the means of payment. Whatever their true historical importance,
imaginary monies remain a tantalizing logical possibility.1
Separation between unit of account and means of payment is also a tradi-
tional theme of monetary futurology (Cowen and Kroszner, 1994), and so is the
notion of multiple monetary standards within the same region (Cohen, 1998,
1999, 2000). But that literature has focused on sweeping transformations to
the means of payment and to the ‘anchoring’ of the price level. Scant thought
has been given to a scheme involving more modest changes in the way transac-
tions are settled: to retain under government control a unique standard for the
exchange medium, adding imaginary monies as alternative units of account.
A modern day motivation for imaginary monies is the same as for ﬂexible
exchange rates: manipulating the parity between the units in which prices are
sticky facilitates relative price adjustment and mitigates resource misallocation
(Friedman, 1953). The net welfare gains must deduct the calculation burden
inherent to multiple units of account.
Just as monetary futurology has been heralding the age of non-territorial,
self-organizing networks of users of diﬀerent means of payment, I consider in-
dividual producers who choose among pricing units on grounds other than lo-
cational. Firms whose idiosyncratic shocks are highly correlated would like to
price together in a separate unit of account, if they could count on parity policy
to facilitate their desired relative price adjustment with respect to the rest of
the economy. Sectoral links may dominate location as a source of correlation
across shocks. It is the self-organizing (and potentially non-territorial) aspect
of the scheme, besides the separation between units of account and means of
payment, that sets it apart from the conventional problem of optimal currency
areas.
This paper ﬂeshes out formally the intuitive case for imaginary monies.2
In section 2, a general equilibrium macroeconomic model with sticky prices
is augmented to incorporate one imaginary money, and the optimal choice of
pricing unit by individual ﬁrms is derived simultaneously with the optimal policy
towards the imaginary money parity. In section 3, I calibrate the model to
quantify the gains on the price misalignment front, to be weighed against one’s
1Historical references include Bloch (1934), Cipolla (1956, 1982, 1991), Einaudi (1936,
1937), Lane and Mueller (1985), and van Werveke (1934).
2This theme made an incipient appearance in Cowen and Kroszner (1994), who did con-
template the possibility of self-organizing, non-territorial networks of users of multiple units
of account. Despite sharing my analogy with OCAs, their initial emphasis was not on the
misallocation of production resulting from misaligned prices, but on the risk of contractual
obligations to deliver a given quantity at predetermined prices - the question of the invoicing
unit of account (pp. 43-4). Later on, they revert to misallocation costs, and to pricing units
chosen according to their correlation with the individual producer’s proﬁt maximizing price,
but do so in the context of commodity bundle units of account rather than imaginary monies
(p. 94). Their discussion is brief and involves no attempt at modeling or quantiﬁcation.
2best guess of the calculation burden of unit of account duplicity. Section 4
interprets the imaginary money exercise as a stepping stone towards more down-
to-earth yet harder problems. Section 5 concludes.
2 An economy with imaginary money
2.1 Basic setup and notation
Consider an economy where prices can be quoted in either one of two units
of account. The ﬁrst is the circulating means of payment, to which I refer
as the real money (r$). The second, which I call imaginary money (i$), is a
disembodied unit of account, deﬁn e db yn om o r et h a na no ﬃcially announced
parity X with respect to the real money: i$X = r$1. There is a continuum
of diﬀerentiated goods indexed by the unit interval. P (z) denotes the price of
good z in terms of real money, and Q(z) its price in terms of imaginary money.
If good z has its price posted as i$Q(z), that is understood as willingness to
trade the good for r$
Q(z)
X .
Each diﬀerentiated good is produced by a monopolistically competitive ﬁrm,
which turns homogeneous labor h(z) into output c(z) a c c o r d i n gt ot h es i m p l e
technology h(z)=c(z)s(z) -i n c r e a s e si ns(z) are adverse cost shocks. I allow
for a subsidy to employment: the government reimburses the ﬁrms for a fraction
(1 − χ) of their payroll, ﬁnancing that expenditure out of lumpsum taxes. The
subsidy can be used to oﬀset distortions due to market power.
There is a representative household with utility function u(c,h), increasing
















The household allocates expenditures in order to minimize the cost of each
unit of c. As a result, the general price level - the price of the expenditure























3in terms of r$ and i$, respectively (Q = XP). The demand for good z,a sa































can be interpreted as a coeﬃcient of relative price misalignment. δ attains




The ﬁrst best outcome for this economy is the maximum of u(c,h) subject
to h = csδ, requiring δ =1and uc (c,h)=−uh(c,h)s. In the decentralized
equilibrium, however, households want uc (c,h)w = −uh(c,h), which will be
suboptimal unless w = 1
s.







where w is the real wage rate. This is solved by p(z)=µχs(z)w;i n t e g r a t i n g
over all z,o n eﬁnds the equilibrium real wage w = 1
µχs. There is no price
misalignment in this equilibrium, and it will coincide with the ﬁr s tb e s ta sl o n g
as χ = 1
µ. Absent the employment subsidy, the equilibrium real wage and level
of activity would be too low.
The model does not include shocks to preferences. With constant desired
mark-ups, they could only aﬀect equilibrium relative prices if marginal costs
changed with output, for a given set of cost curves. That channel shuts down if
marginal cost curves are horizontal - an assumption, however unrealistic, that I
maintain for simplicity.3 The reader should be warned that it tends to overstate
3Blinder et al. (1998) report that most ﬁrms perceive their marginal cost curves as either
ﬂat or decreasing over the relevant range. They interpret that as supportive of Hall’s (1986,
1988) conjecture that marginal costs vary little over the cycle, or even of Ramey’s (1991)
ﬁndings of countercyclical marginal costs. But Blinder et al. admit that industry executives
may have confused marginal with average costs in answering to their survey. Evidence of
procyclical marginal costs is surveyed in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), although some
procyclicality might be due to aggregate factor scarcity rather than to the shape of each
ﬁrm’s cost curves.
4the costs of price misalignment and thus the gains from an imaginary money
scheme, if the true marginal cost curves slope upwards.4
2.2 Cost shocks and price rigidities
Price misalignment may arise because of nominal rigidities: prices set before
costs become known may end up out of line. If some prices are set in real and
others in imaginary money, they can be brought closer to alignment, once costs
are realized, through manipulation of the imaginary money parity. But pricing
decisions, including the choice of unit of account, should anticipate that parity
manipulation.
Because consumers costlessly verify all relative prices, there is no reason
why ﬁrms might want to limit deviations of prices from their expected values,
and shun pricing units that work to restore price ﬂexibility. Search costs might
alter that behavior, as smoother prices help maintain ‘customer goodwill’. The
resulting price stickiness would have a welfare enhancing eﬀect of saving on
aggregate search costs. Such possibilities are not contemplated in this paper.
I study this problem in a static model. In the runup to the single market
period, events unfold as follows: (i) Each ﬁrm chooses between r$ and i$,a n d
posts a price in the chosen unit; (ii) The values of s(z) realize; (iii) Observing
the realized {s(z)},a n dw h a tﬁrms set prices in each unit of account, the
government sets the parity X, while it also sets monetary policy instruments
(not explicitly modeled) so as to deliver a certain P; (iv) A fraction α of the ﬁrms
is randomly selected (as in Calvo, 1983) to post new prices, incorporating all
information already revealed. Every ﬁrm must satisfy all forthcoming demand
at its posted price. In step (i), ﬁrms must take into account what they anticipate
for {s(z)}, X and P.5
In order to facilitate the analysis, an approximation to the model is taken
around the ﬂex-price equilibrium in which all goods share the same s(z)=s,
all prices are equal, and there is no price misalignment. For a generic variable
y, y shall denote its value at the benchmark equilibrium, and b y ≡
y−y
y .F o r
every z, s(z) shall have the same probability distribution with mean s,s ot h a t
Eb s(z)=0 .U pt oaﬁrst order approximation, Eb s =0as well.
From the deﬁnition of the coeﬃcient of price misalignment, one can verify
that, in a neighborhood of the benchmark equilibrium, and up to a ﬁrst order
approximation, b δ =0 . In other words, price misalignment is not a ﬁrst order
phenomenon, and can only be studied with higher order approximations to the
model. Price misalignment achieved an earlier notoriety in the debate over the
costs of inﬂation (see Fischer, 1981), but at the time the impulse was to dismiss
4When sectoral output is below equilibrium, the deadweight loss is overstated because the
model assumes that the shortfall could be produced at the low realized marginal cost. When
output exceeds equilibrium, the overstatement is due to counting every inframarginal unit as
if it had been produced at the high realized marginal cost.
5In reality, the government would not observe {s(z)} directly. Policy would be less powerful
as it would presumably react to indirect signs of cost shocks, such as relative price movements
already observed. One could model those with an extra round of partial price adjustment,
between the realization of {s(z)} and determination of X.
5such second order welfare loss as incapable of ‘piling up a heap of Harberger
triangles tall enough to ﬁll an Okun gap’ - that is, of making a major diﬀerence
i nt h ec a s ef o rd i s i n ﬂation. If the imaginary money scheme involves ﬁrst order
deadweight losses (calculation costs, say, which are not modeled here), then
those are certain to trump the welfare losses from price misalignment whenever
cost shocks become small enough. Yet, the calibrated model of section 3 indicates
that the loss from price misalignment - and the gains from imaginary money -
need not be negligible.
2.3 Minimizing price misalignment
In its own right, price misalignment is bad for welfare: more work eﬀort h
is required to obtain the same amount of the consumption index c, because
consumption concentrates on goods that are relatively cheaper to buy, though
not so much cheaper to produce. The demanded consumption bundle equates
marginal utility ratios to relative prices; if those are not aligned with relative
marginal costs, the allocation of consumption is ineﬃcient.
If a social planner, given s, were to choose c,h and δ in order to maximize
the household’s utility subject to (2), leaving the allocation of consumption
expenditures free to respond to relative prices, then the command optimum
ought to minimize δ. But that is not necessarily what a policymaker should do
in order to implement the best decentralized equilibrium. Policies that reduce δ
impact the equilibrium real wage in one way or another. If the economy operates
below its eﬃcient level of activity, then lower δ accompanied by higher w should
be welcome. If lower δ comes with lower w, welfare could fall.
Under certain assumptions, a δ-minimizing policy does select the best de-
centralized equilibrium. Utility could be such that, in keeping with condition
uc(c,h)w = −uh(c,h), changes in sδ and w get reﬂected either in c or in h, but
not both, cases in which minimization of δ is optimal. In one extreme, minimizing
δ is equivalent to minimizing the eﬀort necessary to obtain the constant equilib-
rium level of consumption; likewise in the other extreme, where it maximizes the
consumption allowed by the constant equilibrium employment.6 Among several
possible examples, the Cobb-Douglas function u(c,h)=( c − c∗)
β (h∗ − h)
1−β
approximates that property arbitrarily well with limiting choices of β ∈ ]0,1[.
As β → 0, all variation concentrates in h, and minimizing δ maximizes equi-
librium u(c,h) → h∗ − c∗sδ.A s β → 1, all variation concentrates in c,a n d
minimizing δ again maximizes equilibrium u(c,h) → h∗
sδ − c∗.
Without restrictions on the utility function, minimization of δ is guaranteed
to be optimal if χ = 1
µ. With that rate of subsidy, the economy would be at
the ﬁrst best equilibrium δ =1and w = 1
s in the absence of cost surprises.
Unexpected cost shocks pull δ away from unity, and that may be more or less
mitigated by policy. Whatever δ materializes, though, it is optimal to match it
6Another way to put it: if either c or h is ﬁxed, then both are fully determined by sδ,
regardless of w, for (2) would not be consistent with only c or h varying with ﬁxed sδ.T h u s ,
policy to reduce δ cannot have welfare side eﬀects through w.
6with w = 1
sδ.R e l a t i v e l yt ot h eﬁrst best equilibrium, w would need to increase
just in the same proportion as sδ falls. The δ-minimizing policy derived below
has that property.7
Of course, neither set of assumptions is realistic, but they serve to keep
the focus on the most direct channel for imaginary money to improve welfare,
namely, reducing price misalignment and making the allocation of production
across goods more eﬃcient. Once minimization of δ is acknowledged as the
legitimate policy goal, the developments below need no further recourse to either
set of assumptions.
2.4 Optimal pricing













where v denotes the household’s marginal utility of income in each state of














For ﬁrms that start by posting an i$ price, the latter two equations apply with
Q(z) and Q substituted for P(z) and P. Firms selected to set prices after s(z)
realizes behave as in the ﬂex-price case: P (z)=µχs(z)Pw.
Let Γ be the set of ﬁrms that choose to post prices in imaginary money, and
γ its measure; let A be the set of ﬁrms selected to adjust prices ex post,a n dα
its measure. A ﬁrst order approximation to the pricing rules above yields the





b s(z)+b P + b w if z ∈ A
Eb s(z)+E b P + E b w − ( b X − E b X) if z ∈ Γ\A
Eb s(z)+E b P + E b w if z ∈ [0,1]\(A ∪ Γ)
(3)
Integrating (3) over all z and performing some algebraic manipulation, one
obtains the following ﬁrst order relation:










b X − E b X
´
(4)
The equilibrium real wage is thus determined by the aggregate cost shock
and the surprises in the r$ price level and the imaginary money parity. With-
out surprises in either b P or b X, the real wage is inversely proportional to the
7Up to a ﬁrst order approximation (since δ displays no ﬁrst order variation) w must vary
in inverse proportion to s,w h i c hi sv e r i ﬁed by (4) and (7).
7aggregate cost shock. Consider what would happen if there was still no surprise
in b P, but the government reacted to the shocks with a surprise revaluation of
the imaginary money ( b X − E b X<0). All goods in Γ\A would become more
expensive in terms of r$, while the r$ prices of goods in [0,1]\(A ∪ Γ) would
not change. To avoid a surprise in b P,t h er$ prices of the ﬂex-price goods must
fall, which is only possible if the equilibrium real wage falls. The larger is the
proportion γ of prices buoyed up by the surprise in b X, and the smaller is the
proportion α of prices that adjust ex post, the larger the movement in real wages
needs to be. Allowing some upward surprise in b P would take pressure oﬀ the
ﬂex-price goods to compensate for the r$ price increases occurred elsewhere.
2 . 5 C h o i c eo fu n i to fa c c o u n t
Firms choose between pricing in r$ or in i$ comparing the maximized values of
their expected proﬁts under either choice, which yields the following criterion









































The strict inequality means that, whenever indiﬀerent between the two units
of account in terms of expected proﬁts, ﬁrms post prices in r$.T h a ts e r v e st o
eliminate from Γ any positive measure of price setters with a ﬂeeting allegiance
to i$. Here, it is implicitly assumed that pricing in imaginary money carries
no inherent disadvantage: the proﬁt function is the same for either choice of
unit of account. If there were an arbitrarily small imaginary money handicap in
the relationship with customers, then price setters who are otherwise indiﬀerent
between i$ and r$ would switch en masse to the real money. I choose from the
start not to count those in Γ.
I consider a second order approximation to the criterion above, which is
easier to manipulate and to interpret:
cov
h
b s(z) − b s, b X
i
+










var b X<0 (5)
The covariance term appears for very intuitive reasons. When b s(z) − b s>0,
ﬁrm z would like to have its relative price increased, which will happen if it has
priced in i$ and b X<0. The more likely such parity changes are to produce the
ﬁrm’s desired price changes - the more negative is cov
h
b s(z) − b s, b X
i
- the stronger
the incentive to price in i$. Once a price is posted in i$,r e a lp r o ﬁts will depend
on
Q(z)
Q , where the numerator is ﬁxed; likewise for
P(z)
P , which determines real
proﬁts from prices set in r$. Uncertainty about the denominator in these ratios
reduces the expected value of real proﬁts, as the ﬁrm is more likely to be away
8from the proﬁt maximizing price.8 If Q is more uncertain than P, ﬁrms are
discouraged from pricing in i$; hence the term in varb Q − varb P in (5). The
rightmost term in (5) is less transparent, because it stems from the indirect
eﬀect of b X through the equilibrium real wage.
2.6 Monetary policy, real and imaginary
Monetary policy is assumed to control X and P directly. The imaginary money
parity is just a number that the policymaker needs to publish. Direct control
over P is interpreted as standing in for control of a conventional monetary policy
instrument that aﬀects the price level in real money. There will be an optimal
choice of both X and P in the sense of minimizing price misalignment. But
stability of the purchasing power of the real money may be of interest in its own
right, constraining the manipulation of P.











[b s(z) − b s]
2 dz + 1
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b P − E b P
´³





b X − E b X
´R
Γ
[b s(z) − b s]dz
¾
(6)
Minimization of b δ with respect to b P−E b P and b X−E b X produces, up to a ﬁrst or-
der approximation, the same policy reaction by the government as minimization
of the exact δ.
Note ﬁrst that optimally chosen b P −E b P would exactly oﬀset the impact of
b X − E b X on the equilibrium real wage given by (4):
b P − E b P = −γ
³
b X − E b X
´
(7)
However, when it comes to the purchasing power of the means of payment held
by private agents, other considerations besides price misalignment are likely to
impinge on the choice of b P −E b P, namely, the welfare eﬀects of inﬂation through
the holdings of money balances. Without modelling the demand for money, it
is not possible to quantify those eﬀects, but their consideration should dampen
the desired b P −E b P variations. To allow for that possibility, I replace (7) with:
b P − E b P = −λγ
³
b X − E b X
´
(8)
where λ ∈ [0,1]. This nests the extreme cases of a b P policy intended to minimize
price misalignment (λ =1 ) and of an ‘inﬂation nutter’ (λ =0 ,s ot h a tb P −E b P =
0 no matter what), as well as everything else in between. Note that (8) implies
8These deviations have a second order eﬀect on expected proﬁts, which is decisive here, in
the absence of ﬁrst order terms.
9b Q − E b Q =( 1 − λγ)
³
b X − E b X
´
.I n c r e a s e s i n λ shift the impact of a parity
change from the i$ price level to the r$ price level. The λ =1partition would
be guided by price misalignment considerations alone, being for that reason
proportional to the adoption of each unit of account in pricing. That would
mean no preference for insulating the purchasing power of r$ balances held by
private agents over that of a disembodied unit of account.
The results for λ =0also apply to another interpretation of the government’s
behavior: it simply insists in conducting monetary policy as if the imaginary
money scheme were not present at all. Such policymakers, despite truly caring
about price misalignment (λ < 0), erroneously stick to b P − E b P =0 ,w h i c h
would indeed be optimal if b X−E b X =0but not otherwise - a behavior identical
to the inﬂation nutter’s. That might describe what an imaginary money scheme
arranged by the private sector would achieve without persuading the government
that a reassessment of monetary policy is warranted.
Combined with (8), the ﬁrst order condition for optimal b X − E b X is:
£
αγ (1 − γ)+( 1− λ)γ2¤³





[b s(z) − b s]dz (9)





b s(z) − b s, b X − E b X
i
<




b X − E b X
´¾
(10)
An equilibrium is characterized by Γ (with the corresponding γ)a n d b X − E b X
(contingent on the realization of cost shocks) that satisfy (9) and (10).9
In two situations, (9) leaves the parity choice indeterminate. The ﬁrst is
when γ =0 : since nobody prices in i$, the choice of parity cannot make any
diﬀerence for price misalignment. Whether or not that is an equilibrium depends
on whether Γ = ∅ is consistent with (10), given an arbitrary choice of parity
policy. If policy makes b X − E b X =0 , then indeed Γ = ∅, since no one has any
motive to strictly prefer to price in i$. So, not having any operative imaginary
money is always an equilibrium.
The other case of indeterminacy arises when γ = λ =1(the integral on the
right-hand side of (9) is zero when Γ =[ 0 ,1]). Even if there was an arbitrary
choice of parity policy such that (10) would yield Γ =[ 0 ,1], the result would be
a fragile equilibrium. If γ =1but λ were instead any less than unity, then (9)
would fully determine b X −E b X =0 . But parity choice would then be rendered
irrelevant for expected proﬁts; with no one strictly preferring to price in i$,t h e
9λ need not pertain only to the policymaker’s preferences, but may also depend on struc-




b P − E b P
´2
,
where ρ > 0 describes his or her preferences over price misalignment versus disturbances to
the r$ price level. Minimizing that yields (8) and (9) as ﬁrst order conditions, λ being a
function of ρ, α and µ (with range [0,1]). Note that λ would not depend on the endogenous
parameter γ.
10result would need to be γ =0rather than γ =1 . I disregard both cases of
indeterminacy, and focus on equilibria in which imaginary money is present and
operative.
3 The gains from imaginary money
3.1 Benchmarks
Consider what would happen if the government turned its back on imaginary
money, and kept b X − E b X =0always. Regardless of the value of λ, monetary
policy would also keep b P−E b P =0all the time. Pricing in either unit of account
would produce the same expected real proﬁts, so no agent would strictly prefer
to price in i$, and the imaginary money would not be used at all. The price










[b s(z) − b s]
2 dz (11)
For a given realization of the cost shocks, b δ
∗
is a measure of the welfare loss
due to price rigidity, unmitigated by imaginary money. It is naturally larger
when prices are stickier (α is lower). It is also larger when market power is
weaker (µ is lower), because weaker market power is a reﬂe c t i o no fh i g h e rc r o s s
elasticities of substitution, which in turn mean that any given price misalignment
causes greater misallocation of production. Misalignment also increases with
the dispersion of the idiosyncratic component of cost shocks, as captured by the
integral. In particular, cost shocks that hit all industries equally do not matter
for price misalignment.
Policies that use the imaginary money can have their impact on price mis-
alignment evaluated by comparing their respective Eb δ to the benchmark Eb δ
∗
.
If var[b s(z) − b s]=σ2 for all z (henceforth a maintained assumption), then
Eb δ =( 1− θ)Eb δ
∗





















corr[b s(z) − b s,b s(ξ) − b s]dξdz (13)
This θ measures what proportion of the expected price misalignment due to
sticky prices gets eliminated by the imaginary money scheme. Because equilib-
rium γ turns out not to depend on σ or µ, neither does θ.
There are two cases in which θ can be readily turned into a statement about
the welfare gains from imaginary money. The ﬁrst is an economy without mon-
etary frictions, or approaching a cashless limit as in Woodford (1998, 2000).
11Aside from minimization of δ, the representative household has no reason to
care directly about inﬂation in r$, and an enlightened government should have
λ =1 . The second case takes as given that λ =0 : either the government is an
inﬂation nutter, or it does not acknowledge the impact of imaginary money on
aggregate conditions. With λ =0 ,t h ei$ parity aﬀects δ but not the r$ price
level. Regardless of the social preferences over minimization of δ versus stabi-
lization of P, the reduction of δ captures the full extent of the welfare gains. If,
instead, monetary frictions were not negligible but λ > 0, policy described by
(8) and (9) would aﬀect welfare through both δ and the variability of P; the net
welfare eﬀect would depend on the microfoundations of social preferences over
these objectives, which I have not modeled.
For the two polar cases, welfare gains depend on θ a n do nh o wl a r g et h e






Up to ﬁrst order, ∆ measures the proportional increase in consumption allowed
by a given work eﬀort, relatively to the benchmark without imaginary money.
Unlike θ,i td o e sd e p e n do nµ and σ.
3.2 Cosinoid correlations
Calculation of the equilibrium Γ ultimately calls for the correlations among
idiosyncratic cost shocks. Bending the continuum of ﬁrms into a circle of unit
length allows for a symmetric setup: for any two ﬁrms, only the distance between
them, and not the absolute location of the pair, matters for the correlation
between their shocks. A particularly convenient speciﬁcation for the correlation
coeﬃcients is:
corr[b s(z) − b s,b s(ξ) − b s]=c o s2 π (z − ξ)
for all z and ξ on the circle. Because correlations fall monotonically with dis-
tance, the equilibrium Γ is always an arc on the circle. But there is no ‘natural’
location for Γ - only its length matters. I ﬁx one endpoint of Γ at zero, and
denote the other by γ.10
Equilibrium γ is found by solving numerically the nonlinear equation:
sin(2πγ)=
α +2 γ (1 − α − λ)
αγ (1− γ)+( 1− λ)γ2
1 − cos2πγ
2π
The results derived below are meant as merely illustrative. In less tractable
alternatives, correlations determined by distance alone could die away slower
10The fact that Γ could be located anywhere on the circle does not mean that the partition
of the economy between units of account must remain indeterminate. Indeterminacy would
indeed occur if the government reacted to any spontaneously arising Γ with policies described
b y( 8 )a n d( 9 ) . B u ti tc a na l s op i c ka na r b i t r a r i l yl o c a t e dΓ of the right size and commit
to a policy guided by substituting that Γ into (8)-(9). Private agents will align themselves
accordingly, and there will be no temptation to deviate from the announced policy, which will
be optimal ex post.
12or faster than implied by the cosinoid, which would clearly change the results
without necessarily making them more representative of real world economies.
There is no way of knowing short of a much greater sacriﬁce of tractability:
to abandon symmetry altogether and embark in a serious eﬀort to match the
model to empirical covariance matrices.
3.3 A calibrated economy
In dynamic models with staggered prices, α is calibrated to match the observed
duration of prices. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) calibrate for a mean dura-
tion of three quarters, as found by Blinder (1994) and Blinder et al. (1998). Such
calibration of a quarterly model implies that only a third of the prices change
before one semester of being set, which agrees with the ﬁnding of Blinder et al.
that 35% of ﬁrms adjust prices that often. All that suggests interpreting the
length of the period described in my model as one semester, and setting α = 1
3.
Results for lower α’s are also reported: the parity X could change at a higher
frequency exactly to oﬀset more of the existing price stickiness.
Table 1 displays the results for γ and θ (both as percentages) for several
combinations of α and λ. θ is obviously highest when monetary policy targets
price misalignment alone (λ =1 ). The economy is evenly partitioned between
r$ and i$ price setters, and price misalignment gets reduced by about 40%. In
this case, neither γ nor θ depends on α.
Under an inﬂation nutter (λ =0 ), the i$ is used by less than a third of ﬁrms.
Imaginary money is so disadvantaged because its real value bears the entire
brunt of changes in X. There is much less reduction in price misalignment: as
little as 10% when α = 1
5. Results follow an intermediate pattern for values of
λ between 0 and 1.
Table 2 reports results on ∆ (as percentages), for the cashless limit case
λ =1 .If o c u so nµ =1 .15, as estimated by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
Recall that higher mark-ups correspond to lower elasticities of substitution,
which mitigate the misallocation of production arising from a given degree of
price misalignment.
No oﬀ-the-shelf numbers existed for σ. Table 3 displays some crude esti-
mates, expressed as percentages and described below. One should regard rows
II and III as conservative estimates of σ, which depend however on certain
assumptions and on further estimates of key technology parameters. Row IV
is still plausible, and row V contains outside ﬁgures for σ, while those in row I
are a loose but robust lower bound. I focus on the more conservative σ’s of the
second column, which excludes the period of the oil shocks.11
If σ is in the 9-11% range of rows II and III, gains from imaginary money
would be equivalent to 0.8-1.2% of output (with the benchmark µ =1 .15, α =
1
3). At the 7% lower bound for σ s h o w ni nr o wI, there would be gains of 0.5%
11σ is estimated from yearly data. It is unclear how it should be adjusted to go along
with α calibrated for higher frequencies: the adjustment could actually could go either way,
depending on the serial correlation of the cost shocks within the year, on which I have no
information.
13of output. Gains would amount to 1.7% of output for σ =1 3 %(as in row IV),
rise to 2.2% when σ =1 5 % , and reach 3.8% if σ were the 20% of row V .
Numbers of that order are a major achievement for macroeconomic stabi-
lization policy. Unlike tuning a monetary policy rule, however, they come at a
cost - the calculation burden of the multiple units of account. Emerson et al.
(1992) present estimates of currency exchange costs - the costs of transacting in
foreign exchange markets - which are not the costs that imaginary monies would
entail. It is also clear that calculation costs proper - the nuisance of convert-
ing prices from one unit of account to another for comparison and settlement
- would be more widespread with non-locational imaginary monies than in a
world with multiple national currencies, where they apply only to cross-border
transactions. There is little hope of putting a value on that nuisance except by
introspection.12
Corresponding results for λ =0could be easily inferred from tables 1 and
2( ∆ is just proportional to θ): roughly, the welfare gains would range from a
fourth to a third of their values under λ =1 . Gains of the order of 0.3%-0.6% of
output (with µ =1 .15, α = 1
3) would obtain with an imaginary money scheme
lacking any cooperation from the monetary authority in terms of moving P
around with an eye on δ. Concurrence of r$ monetary policy is important to
reap the full beneﬁts from the scheme - very much so if social preferences call
for a low λ. But there is something in imaginary money even under monetary
policymakers who behave as if it were not there.
For the sake of comparison, one can compute the optimal command partition
of the economy into two groups of price setters, one being mandated to price in
r$, and the other in i$. Without self-organization, the problem is akin to forming
two optimal currency areas, except that they need not follow territorial lines.
The enforcement of a non-territorial mandated partition would be impractical
- after all, it works in territorial currency areas if monetary functions are not
separated, while separation is crucial for imaginary money. What the exercise
reveals is how close the decentralized equilibrium is to the command optimum.
Given policy described by (8) and (9), the best command partition of the
economy is the one that minimizes θ,a sl o n ga sp r i c em i s a l i g n m e n td o e sr e p r e -
sent social welfare - which is true if monetary frictions are negligible and λ =1 ,
or else if λ =0 . Solving that problem numerically, one obtains precisely the
same γ, θ and ∆ as in the decentralized equilibrium. In either case, the decen-
tralized nature of the imaginary money scheme detracts nothing from what the
very best split into two (not necessarily territorial!) currency areas would yield.
12In another model-based welfare analysis, Canzoneri and Rogers (1990) ﬁnd that Europe
would gain from monetary union if ‘valuation costs’ were as high as 0.7% of production costs.
The beneﬁts of multiple currencies would be much smaller than suggested here, especially
since they take several currencies, rather than just two units of account. But the only advan-
tage Canzoneri and Rogers attribute to multiple currencies is the freedom to pursue diﬀerent
seigniorage targets, according to optimal taxation criteria particular to each country - some-
thing imaginary monies would not oﬀer. They disregard the eﬀects of sticky prices.
143.4 Estimating σ
The estimates of σ contained in Table 4 are based on the US Manufacturing
Industry Database.13 It contains yearly cost and output data for the 458 man-
ufacturing industries of the 4-digit SIC.14
In year t,l e td MCt (z) be the percentage deviation of industry z’s nomi-
nal marginal cost from its expected value,a n d d MCt their cross-sectional mean.
Then, d MCt (z)=b st (z)+b Pt + b wt and d MCt = b st + b Pt + b wt.T h e t i m e s e r i e s
variances of the idiosyncratic cost shock b s(z) − b s c a nb ew r i t t e na s :
σ2(z)=var
h
d MCt (z) − d MCt
i
In the model, those are the same for every industry, which is unlikely to hold in
the data. Allowing for heteroskedasticity in the model would ruin its symmetry.
Instead, I calibrate σ2 after a cross-sectional weighted average of all σ2 (z).
For each industry, I compute a 1959-1996 series ACt(z) of average costs
of intermediate inputs (materials and energy). If the production function is
isoelastic in intermediate input use, then ACt(z) is a constant multiple of the
MCt(z),a n dd ACt(z)= d MCt (z). But the evidence indicates otherwise: factors
are not likely to be that substitutable, and ACt(z) should vary less than MCt(z).













where µ is the mark-up, ² is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
inputs and primary factors (both assumed common to all industries), sM(z)
is the industry’s average share (over time) of intermediate inputs in the value
of output, and IORt(z) is the ratio of intermediate inputs to output.15 All
sM(z) and IORt(z) are directly computed from the database, and µ is set at
1.15.B e s i d e s² =1 , which simply recovers ACt(z),t h eﬁrst calibration for the
elasticity of substitution is ² =0 .7, close to the estimate by Rotemberg and
Woodford (1996). Their estimate is obtained from 2-digit SIC data, and some
of the measured substitution between intermediate inputs and primary factors
might be picking up substitution across products that, within the same 2-digit
code, happen to be more intensive in one or the other. Within 4-digit industry
codes, there should be fewer such opportunities to substitute across products,
and one would expect a lower ² at that level of disaggregation. Lower estimates
would also be expected if, unlike Rotemberg and Woodford, one measured factor
13The database and its documentation (Bartelsman and Gray, 1987) can be downloaded
from the NBER website.
14SIC has 459 codes, but the asbestos industry disappeared in mid-sample.
15The procedure is described by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999, pp. 1064-5), on which this
section relies heavily. It assumes constant returns to scale. Here, it is modiﬁed in a number
of minor ways: to ﬁnd a proxy for marginal costs rather than for mark-ups; to apply to AC
rather than to the labor share in output; to denote the adjustment term as a function of IOR
rather than the primary factors to output ratio; and to rely on a log-linear approximation
only with respect to IOR, but not with respect to AC itself.
15substitution within the year instead of that happening over two year horizons.
I also report results for ² =0 .6, 0.5 and 0.4.
T og e ta tt h ec o s tsurprise, I let each industry, guided by Akaike’s Informa-
tion Criterion, choose an AR speciﬁcation for logMCt (z)−logMCt−1 (z),w i t h
any number of lags between 1 and 10, using 1970-1996 as a ﬁxed sample period,
and relying on as many data points as necessary from the 1960-1969 pre-sample.
The estimated AR’s generate one period ahead forecasts of marginal costs, from
1970 to 1996, which are used to calculate deviations d MCt (z) and their mean
d MCt (weighted by the industry’s participation in the year’s output). Variances
σ2(z) are computed, either over the whole sample (1970-1996) or just over the
post-oil shock half-sample (1983-1996), and then averaged into σ2 with weights
given by the participation of each industry in 1983 output.16 The corresponding
σ’s (expressed as percentages) are reported in Table 4.
Note that estimates of σ based on the 4-digit SIC may still suﬀer from
downward aggregation bias. They average out the variation across diﬀerentiated
products included in the same 4-digit category, and also all spatial variation
in cost shocks (for non-tradeables, that variation should also be matched by
movements in relative prices).
4D o w n t o E a r t h
Disembodied units of account have reappeared a number of times since their
medieval occurrences, but never in the spirit of the imaginary monies examined
here. The pre-circulation euro had ﬁxed parities with respect to all currencies
in EMU. ECU parities were not so irrevocably ﬁxed but it was seldom used
in pricing (Bordo and Schwartz, 1989). Indexed units are common under high
inﬂation, but they do not facilitate relative price changes prompted by real
shocks - quite to the contrary, they avoid undue relative price changes caused
by price staggering.
China had at some point a unique bimetallic standard with a ﬂoating silver-
copper parity. Chen (1975) identiﬁed there a fascinating example of ‘currency
areas’ self-organized by sector and not by location. Cavallo (2001) speculates
about the future of Argentina as a trimonetary economy where ﬁrms will choose
to price in euros, dollars, or pesos according to sectoral links. Non-territorial
self-organization of price setters is present in the two examples, but both dif-
fer from the imaginary money scheme in the very real nature of their units of
account and in the fact that parities do not deliberately minimize price mis-
alignment.
The imaginary money scheme puts together self-organization of price set-
ters and disembodied units of account linked by parities managed to minimize
16For ²<1, I truncate the distribution of σ(z) to weed out spurious outliers from σ2.
Lower ² should be reﬂe c t e di nl e s sv a r i a b l eIOR, or else the adjustment term in (15) would
swing wildly. When I apply a lower ² across the board, such swings occur in some industries,
producing extremely high σ(z). Inspection of the cross-sectional distributions of σ(z) reveals
that discarding the eight highest takes care of the outlier problem in all cases reported here.
16price misalignment. Although assembled from familiar pieces, so experimental
a monetary design should not be taken literally as a blueprint for reform. More
practically, it can be read as stark ﬁrst approach to problems that are closer at
hand but are harder to analyze. Disembodied units of account are in no way
central to such problems. The important premises are monetary policymak-
ers concerned about relative price misalignment arising from idiosyncratic real
shocks, and some endogenous choice of pricing currency.
Each of these two premises has been separately explored in recent research.
Benigno (2001) analyzes a monetary union exposed to (among other things)
relative price shocks. Monetary policy attempts to alleviate some of the price
misalignment, but it can only do so much when there is a single currency; at
any rate, there is no endogenous choice of pricing currency. Devereux and Engel
(2001) study the endogenous choice of pricing currency in foreign transactions,
obtaining conditions similar to criterion (5). But monetary policies are exoge-
nous, and there are no real shocks to change equilibrium relative prices, only
nominal shocks driving relative prices away from equilibrium. If monetary pol-
icy goes after relative prices and producers have a choice of pricing currency,
then the two problems - choice of currency by price setters and the government’s
choice of policy - are interrelated and must be solved simultaneously.
The imaginary money scheme is the vanilla ﬂavor of that generic exercise:
a plain and simple base for a variety of fancier extensions. Such extensions
c a nb et a i l o r e dt om u c hless extravagant setups. One example would restrict
imaginary monies to intermediate good sales, thus sparing the consumer from
the discomfort of calculating price conversions at retail outlets. Another exam-
ple would be regional monetary policy coordination with adjustable exchange
rates. A freer choice of pricing unit among the coordinating currencies (all real!)
might apply only to cross border transactions, or to sectors with a strong for-
e i g nt r a d ep r e s e n c e . P a r t i c i p a t i o no fe a c hc u r r e n c yi np r i c i n gm i g h tt u r no u t
diﬀerent from its share in the means of payment. That, in turn, would justify
attaching a diﬀerent weight to stabilizing the real value of each currency. Such
considerations are recognized as a relaxed version of those already present in
the imaginary money scheme.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper considers the consequences of allowing producers to choose among
diﬀerent currencies for pricing, and at the same time managing the purchas-
ing power of those currencies in order to minimize resource misallocation due
to price stickiness. Producers band together around the available pricing units
according to the covariances among their relative price shocks, which may be
determined by sectoral links rather than geographical location. The individual
choice of pricing currency depends on how the values of the diﬀerent curren-
cies are managed; their best management in turn depends on who prices in
each currency. Individual price setting and policy choice are thus simultaneous
problems.
17In a static setting, simple conditions make it legitimate for stabilization pol-
icy to single-mindedly target price misalignment. First, some other instrument
must correct market power distortions, or else stabilization policy must have no
bearing on those distortions. Second, monetary frictions must become negligi-
ble. If the latter fails, price misalignment still ranks correctly all stabilization
policies that do not impinge on the purchasing power of the means of payment
(but may aﬀect the purchasing power of disembodied units of account).
When price misalignment is indeed the proper policy target, the decen-
tralized equilibrium replicates the optimal pricing unit assignments. That is
important because command assignments are much harder to enforce if pric-
ing units become separable from legal tender currencies - as it must be the
case for the split to occur along non-territorial lines. It amounts to saying
that OCAs not beholden to geography are theoretically feasible as a product
of self-organization, if monetary separation takes hold. Relaxing the locational
requirement for membership in a currency ‘area’ enhances the potential beneﬁts
of adjustable parities. On the other hand, the calculation burden of currency
multiplicity would go beyond cross-border transactions, being greater than in
territorial OCAs.
An admittedly rudimentary model with a single currency and no stretch
of calibration puts the deadweight loss from price misalignment at 2.5%-5% of
GDP. One more currency could cut the loss by 40%. In the real world, the
covariance matrix of relative price shocks might make misalignment losses con-
siderably smaller and also harder to mitigate with multiple currencies. Anyway,
the quantitative results warn against an out-of-hand dismissal of such ineﬃcien-
cies as too small to bother.
Instituting a pure unit of account with a well managed parity produces
a t t r a c t i v er e s u l t se v e ni fa c t u a lm o n e t a r yp o l i c yp r e s s e so nw i t ht h eb e h a v i o r
that was optimal when all prices were sticky in the means of payment. But
price misalignment would be reduced to a much greater extent if monetary
policy could be enlisted as well, placing the purchasing power of the means of
payment at the service of price misalignment mitigation. Otherwise, the use of
pure units of account would be discouraged by the higher volatility of their real
value, limiting the scope for relative price correction.
Whether gains of any plausible magnitude are enough to compensate for the
nuisance of price conversions is a question likely to remain open. A skeptical
reader might interpret the numbers reported above as the deadweight losses from
our inability to get around that nuisance once we concede defeat in eliminating
the root cause of relative price rigidity.
The thought experiment carried out in this paper derives practical interest
from potential extensions to more complicated but less far-fetched versions of the
problem - as a common thread, the simultaneous choices of pricing currencies by
individual producers subject to idiosyncratic shocks, and of monetary policies
concerned with price misalignment. Candidate extensions include imaginary
monies being used for pricing in a limited class of transactions, where calculation
costs are less likely to be prohibitive. They may also involve no imaginary monies
at all, but apply to the coordination of monetary policies among real currencies
18in a regional integration arrangement, if certain producers are allowed to choose
pricing unit according to how much it facilitates their desired relative price
adjustment.
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λ α = 1
5 α = 1
4 α = 1
3 α = 1
5 α = 1
4 α = 1
3
0 26.5 28.0 29.9 10.2 11.7 13.8
0.2 28.0 29.5 31.4 13.1 14.8 17.2
0.4 29.9 31.4 33.3 16.9 18.8 21.4
0.6 32.6 34.1 36.0 22.2 24.2 26.7
0.8 37.1 38.5 40.1 29.9 31.6 33.5
1 50 50 50 40.5 40.5 40.5
Table 2
∆
α µ\σ 7% 9% 11% 13% 15% 20%
1
5 1.10 0.86 1.40 2.05 2.81 3.65 6.07
1.15 0.60 0.98 1.45 2.00 2.62 4.43
1.20 0.47 0.77 1.14 1.58 2.08 3.55
1
4 1.10 0.80 1.31 1.93 2.64 3.44 5.74
1.15 0.56 0.92 1.36 1.88 2.46 4.18
1.20 0.44 0.73 1.07 1.49 1.95 3.35
1
3 1.10 0.72 1.17 1.72 2.37 3.09 5.18
1.15 0.50 0.82 1.22 1.68 2.20 3.76




I ² =1 8.2 7.0
II ² =0 .7 10.6 9.0
III ² =0 .6 12.4 10.7
IV ² =0 .5 15.4 13.3
V ² =0 .4 21.9 20.2
21